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         Abstract 
 
This article will explore the evolution of China’s border policy through the 1950s and 1960s. 
Drawing on newly available archival sources and recent secondary literature, it will argue that 
during the early Cold War, the PRC leadership lacked a clear sense of the concept of national 
sovereignty, and often attempted to use territorial negotiations with China’s neighbours to bargain 
for broader foreign policy objectives. The article will also examine the historical and political 
assumptions underlying Mao Zedong’s approach to border questions, suggesting that Mao combined 
longstanding imperial assumptions about universal emperorship with the modern, Marxist idea of 
a world revolution.  
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China’s management of relations with neighbouring states, especially where shared 
borders were disputed, was a crucial aspect of its Cold War foreign policy. The borders 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are unusually extensive and complex. The PRC 
has the longest land and maritime borders of any country in the world, in excess of 
18,000 kilometres and 22,000 kilometres, respectively. Russia’s borders, by comparison, 
extend 19,990 kilometres; Brazil’s 14,690 kilometres and India’s 14,100 kilometres. 
China’s frontier regions also cover an enormous area. Nine mainland provinces and 
autonomous regions are situated along China’s land borders (Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Tibet, Yunnan and Guangxi); ten along 
its maritime borders (Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Tianjin and Shanghai), in addition to the island of Hainan. In total, these 
provinces occupy an area of 6,770,000 square kilometres: 70% of China’s total territory 
(the provinces along China’s land borders alone occupy more than 62% of this total). 
China shares borders with more countries than any other state in the world. In the early 
years of the People’s Republic of China, it shared land borders with twelve other nations: 
North Korea, the USSR, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Burma, Laos and Vietnam. After India’s annexation of Sikkim and the dissolution of the 
USSR (and secession of Kazakstan, Kyrgystan and Tajikistan), China came to share 
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borders with fourteen other countries. China shares maritime borders with eight 
countries: South and North Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Indonesia. Furthermore, China’s national minorities are concentrated in its border areas. 
Four of China’s five autonomous regions are located on its frontiers (the fifth being 
Ningxia). Most of China’s fifty-plus national minorities inhabit frontier zones, and many 
spill out over the country’s official borders.1 These “transnational” national minorities are 
extremely various culturally, religiously and economically, and they maintain close links 
with other members of the same ethnic group who inhabit areas beyond China’s borders. 
For long periods of its history, China’s security, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity have depended on how successfully it has managed relations and resolved 
border disputes with neighbouring states. Yet for decades after the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, the history of China’s border conflicts received little 
scholarly attention on the mainland (with the exception of Tsarist Russia’s erosion of 
Chinese territory, which generated much politically motivated research). Since the 1980s, 
and due in part to the creation of a Research Centre into Border History, we have seen a 
growth in historical work on this area. We now have access, for example, to a number of 
scholarly overviews of China’s historical approach to border questions and its policy 
outcomes. 2  Many academics have written about imperial China’s management of its 
borders. 3  Since the 2000s, moreover, due largely to the declassification of China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives and to the opening of certain provincial and 
municipal archives, more substantial research on Chinese border policy during the 1950s 
                                                        
1  Demographic statistics indicate that thirty of China’s national minorities (a population of some 
66,000,000) spill out over national borders and operate within multiple language groups. 
2 See, for example, Liao Xinwen, “Ershi shiji wushi niandai Zhongguo chuli ludi bianjie wenti de yuanze ye 
banfa” (The principles by and ways in which post-1949 China managed issues relating to its land borders) 
(paper presented at the conference “China in the 1950s”, Shanghai, August 2004); Xu Yan, “Jiefanghou 
woguo chuli bianjie chongtu weiji de  huigu he zongjie (A summary of China’s management of border 
conflicts and crises since 1949), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi 3 (2005): 16-21; Gao Fei, “Jianping Zhongguo chuli 
lingtu zhengduan de yuanze ji linian” (A brief appraisal of the principles and concepts behind China’s 
management of territorial conflicts), Waijiao pinglun 105 (October 2008): 25-31; Nie Hongyi and Li Bin, 
“Zhongguo zai lingtu zhengduan zhong de zhengce xuanze” (China’s territorial disputes and policy 
choices), Guoji zhengzhixue 4 (2008): 1-34; Liu Xiaoyuan, “Bianjiang Zhongguo he 1949 nian” (1949 on 
China’s frontiers), Zhongguo dangdai shi yanjiu 3 (2011): 117-136; Nie Hongyi, “Ding ding guojiang: xin 
Zhongguo chengli 60 nian Zhongguo bianjie wenti yanjiu” (Fixing the frontiers: research into China’s 
frontiers since the founding of the PRC) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2011); Zhu Zhaohua, “20 shiji wu liushi 
niandai xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de yuanze yu shijian” (Resolution of China’s border 
disputes in the 1950s and 1960s: theory and practice), Suzhou keji xueyuan xuebao 29.5 (September 2012): 1-
8; Qi Pengfei, Daguo jiangyu: dangdai Zhongguo ludi bianjie wenti shulun (The territory of a major power: on 
contemporary China’s land border issues) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2013); Zhang Qingmin, 
“Zhongguo jiejue ludi bianjie jingyan dui jiejue haiyang bianjie de qishi” (What China can learn from its 
land border disputes in resolving maritime border issues), Waijiao pinglun 4 (2013): 1-16.  
3 Ma Dazheng, “Ershi shiji Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu” (20th-century research into the historical 
geography of China’s frontiers), Lishi yanjiu 4 (1996): 137-151. 
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and 1960s has been carried out, focusing in particular on China’s disputes with the 
USSR, India and Burma.4 Although we can also now access preliminary research into 
China’s disputes and differences with North Korea, Pakistan, Nepal and Afghanistan,5 
we still lack detailed Chinese-language work on China’s border conflicts with Mongolia.6 
Scholars outside China, meanwhile, have concentrated primarily on analyses of Sino-
Soviet and Sino-Indian border conflicts. 7  However, few non-Chinese studies of the 
PRC’s Cold War border issues have made full use of Chinese archival documents.8 
                                                        
4 See particularly: Li Danhui, “Tongzhi jia xiongdi: 1959 niandai Zhong-Su bianjie guanxi – dui Zhong-Su 
bianjie wenti de lishi kaocha (zhi yi)” (Comrades plus brothers: Sino-Soviet border relations in the 1950s – 
a historical investigation into the Sino-Soviet frontier issue (part 1)), Guoji lengzhanshi yanjiu 1 (autumn 
2004): 71-102; “Zhengzhi doushi yu dishou: 1960 niandai Zhong-Su bianjie guanxi – dui Zhong-Su bianjie 
wenti de lishi kaocha (zhi er)” (Political warriors and antagonists: Sino-Soviet border relations in the 1960s 
– a historical investigation into the Sino-Soviet frontier issue (part 2)), Shehui kexue 2 (2007): 146-167; 
Sergey N. Goncharov and Li Danhui, “E-Zhong guanxi zhong de ‘lingtu yaoqiu’ he ‘bupingdeng tiaoyue’” 
(Territorial demands’ and ‘unequal treaties’ in Sino-Soviet relations), Ershiyi shiji (October 2004): 110-117; 
Dai Chaowu, “Zhong-Yin bianjie chongtu yu sulian de fanying he zhengce” (Sino-Indian border clashes 
and the Soviet policy response), Lishi yanjiu 3 (2003): 58-79; Huang Xiangping and Qi Pengfei, “Qianxi 
Zhongguo zhengfu zai Zhong-Yin bianjie zhengduang zhong de weiji chuli” (Preliminary Analysis of the 
Chinese government’s crisis management in the Sino-Indian border dispute), Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 1 
(2006): 79-86; Qiu Meirong, “Weiji waiguozhong de guonei yinsu: yi Zhong-Yin weiji (1959-1962) wei li” 
(Domestic factors in crisis diplomacy: the case-study of the 1959-62 Sino-Indian crisis), Guoji guancha 4 
(2007), 27-33; Ma Rongjiu, “Tongxiang chongtu zhilu: lun Yindi bianjie zhengce yu Zhong-Yin lingtu 
zhengduan” (The road to conflict: on Indian border policy and the Sino-Indian territory dispute), 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Beijing University, 2008); Zhu Zhaohua, Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti yanjiu: yi 
jindai Zhong-Ying bianjie tanpan wei zhongxin (Research into the Sino-Burmese border question, focusing on 
Sino-British border negotiations from the late Qing period), (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007); 
Zhu Zhaohua, “Xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de dianfan – jiyu Zhong-Mian bianjie de huading” 
(New China’s model for handling border disputes, and its origins in the designation of the Sino-Burmese 
border), Tansuo yu zhengming 4 (2009): 73-76; Fan Hongwei, “Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de jiejue: guocheng 
yu yingxiang” (The resolution of the Sino-Burmese border question and its implications), Nanyang wenti 
yanjiu 3 (2010): 36-45.  
5 See Shen Zhihua and Dong Jie, “Zhong-Chao bianji zhengyi de jiejue”, 34-51; Han Xiaoqing, “Zhongguo 
yu Bajisitan jiejue shuangbian ludi bianjie wenti waijiao tanpan de lishi kaocha” (A historical investigation 
into the diplomatic negotiations leading up to the resolution of the Sino-Pakistan border issue), Dangdai 
Zhongguo shi yanjiu 6 (2011): 90-98; Zhou Shougao and Qi Pengfei, “Guanyu 1963 nian Zhong-A bianjie 
tiaoyue tanpan jincheng zhong de ‘leng’ yu ‘re’ xianxiang yu tanxi – yi Zhongguo waijiaobu xinjin jiemi 
dangan wei zhu” (The ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ phases in the 1963 Sino-Afghanistan border treaty negotiations: an 
enquiry based on newly declassified documents in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Nanya yanjiu 4 
(2011): 16-27; Mu Ani, “Chuyi Zhong-Ni bianjie tanpan zhong de jiaodian: Zhufeng wenti de chuli” 
(Preliminary observations on the focus of Sino-Nepalese negotiations: the Everest problem), Dangshi yanjiu 
yu jiaoxue 1 (2013): 55-63. 
6 For reasons of space and focus, China’s border issues with Vietnam, Laos and Bhutan have been omitted 
from the scope of this article.  
7 In China, the most influential works on the Sino-Indian border dispute are Neville Maxwell, India’s China 
War (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1972) and Gupta Karunakar, The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier 
(Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1974). Other important publications include: Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese 
Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1975); Steven A. Hoffman, 
India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the 
High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s (Richmond: Curzon, 1999); John W. Garver, 
Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); 
Gautam Das, China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future (New Delhi: Har-Anand 
Publications PVT LTD, 2009). For Russian scholarship on the history of Sino-Soviet border disputes, see: 
B. I. Tkachenko, Rossiia – Kitai: vostochnaia granitsa v dokumentakh i faktakh (Russia – China: The eastern 
border in documents and facts) (Vladivostok: Ussuri, 1999); Iu. M. Galenovich, Rossiia and Kitai v XX veke: 
Granitsa (Russia and China in the 20th century: the border) (Moskva: Izograf, 2001); V. S. Miasnikov and 
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In the following study of Maoist China’s border policy of the 1950s and 1960s, 
we will argue – drawing on newly available primary archival sources and recent secondary 
literature – that during the early Cold War, the PRC leadership lacked a clear sense of the 
concept of national sovereignty, and attempted to use territorial negotiations with its 
neighbours as a bargaining chip to achieve broader foreign policy objectives. We will 
suggest reasons for this by discussing the specific historical and diplomatic background 
to Maoist China’s handling of border disputes, arguing that a serious conceptual tension 
existed between (on the one hand) Mao’s sense of nationalism, and (on the other) his 
longstanding imperial assumptions about universal emperorship and espousal of the 
modern, Marxist idea of world revolution. We will then summarise the shaping and 
implementation of policy before exploring and explaining its outcomes.  
 
 
China’s Borders: The Republican Inheritance 
 
Chinese scholarly consensus has identified three broad phases in the evolution of China’s 
frontier policy.  
Across the longue durée of imperial history from the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) 
to the early years of the Qing (1644-1911), China’s rulers (theoretically, at least) worked 
on the traditional assumption that “all land under heaven belongs to the sovereign; all 
people within its borders are his subjects”. According to this principle, all China’s 
neighbours were tributary vassal states. The Chinese empire, therefore, was concerned 
not with defining precise borders, but rather with ensuring that neighbouring states were 
submissive. As a result, the empire exercised rather erratic control over its frontier zones; 
borders were left vague. When the centre was weak, the empire retracted; when the 
centre was strong, the empire expanded once more. If neighboring vassals were 
“submissive”, the Chinese government would often gift them territory, as a token of 
imperial favour. For centuries and millennia, therefore, imperial China had frontiers, but 
not borders. This worldview was apparently little affected by periodic invasions and 
occupations by neighbouring states.  
                                                                                                                                                              
E. D. Stepanov, Granitsy Kitaia, Istoriia formitorvaniia (The borders of China: a history of formation) 
(Moskva: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2001). 
8 Probably the best work in recent years by an Anglophone scholar is M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure 
Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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 After the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, European powers increasingly relied on 
border treaties to define the territorial sovereignty of individual states. Four years 
previously, the Manchu Qing Dynasty – from imperial China’s northeastern frontiers – 
had established itself in Beijing after the fall of China’s last ethnically Chinese dynasty, 
the Ming. In unifying and dramatically expanding the empire they took over, the Qing 
partially inherited and perpetuated traditional Chinese imperial assumptions. However, in 
the course of the nineteenth century, the eastward incursions of Russia and Europe and 
the rise of Japan eroded Qing China’s territory. As China was drawn into the modern, 
European-dominated world of nation-states, it could no longer maintain frontiers 
without borders. In 1689, China signed its first modern-style treaty, with Tsarist Russia: 
the Treaty of Nerchinsk. After the first Opium War (1839-42), countries such as Britain, 
Russia and Japan forced a weakened Chinese state to cede large portions of territory in a 
series of unequal treaties (such as the 1858 Treaty of Aigun; the 1860 Treaty of Beijing; 
the 1864 Chuguchak Protocol; the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki). At the same time, the 
states that imperial China had traditionally viewed as its vassals were progressively 
colonized by Britain, France and Japan (Vietnam in 1885; Burma in 1886; Laos in 1893; 
Korea in 1910). These new colonial powers demanded that China should clarify its 
borders, forcing upon China the Western concept of treaty-defined territorial sovereignty.  
 After the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the founding of the Republic in 1912, 
China in theory became a modern nation-state, with modern borders. Sun Yat-sen’s 
initial idea of a “Republic of Five Nationalities” (Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui (Muslim) 
and Tibetan) subsequently developed into the concept of a “Chinese People” (zhonghua 
minzu).9 This new sense of nationalism was an important tool in integrating the centre 
and periphery of the young republic, and for clarifying China’s sense of its own borders. 
However, the political and diplomatic weakness of the republic, added to its continual 
state of war, meant that the Chinese government was not only unable to ameliorate 
longstanding border problems resulting from decades of imperialist incursions into 
Chinese territory and to resolve newly arising disputes with decolonized states on its 
periphery, but was also forced to acknowledge or sign yet more “Unequal Treaties” that 
further undermined national sovereignty (such as the 1941 boundary agreement with 
Britain on Burma or the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance). Although 
                                                        
9 See Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004) on the emergence of modern Chinese nationalism. 
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the Republic of China subscribed to the modern theory of national territorial sovereignty, 
therefore, its government was unable fully to realize this concept.10   
 In 1949, then, the government of the People’s Republic of China took over a 
country whose long and heterogeneous borders had been badly damaged by decades of 
external incursions. A nation-state’s power and ability to self-determine are symbolized 
by, and depend on, its ability to define the bounds of its territory. In order to establish 
itself as a modern nation-state, the People’s Republic needed as a matter of urgency to 
resolve its many territorial disputes with neighbouring states, and to define its borders 
and modernize its sense of territorial sovereignty, in line with international norms. 
However, the new government faced many obstacles in completing these tasks. 
 Firstly, China had never signed a comprehensive border treaty with any of its 
neighbours. Most of its borders were de-facto frontiers pragmatically defined by 
convention, or had been dictated by overbearing imperialist powers or by the vagaries of 
fluctuating political control. As a result, the states concerned often observed different 
borders from those observed by China, a situation which inevitably generated disputes.  
 Secondly, even where broad consensus about a border existed, other complexities 
presented themselves: treaties and the maps and surveys attached were often ambiguous; 
or, unbeknownst to governments, physical boundary markers were sometimes moved, or 
locals migrated back and forth across the border in question, until political control on the 
ground bore little resemblance to the theoretically agreed boundary. 
 Thirdly, apart from its treaties with Russia and the Soviet Union, all China’s 
previous border treaties had been signed with colonial suzerain states or protectorates. 
                                                        
10 For further discussion on the above, see: Zhong Hongnian, “Qingdai fanshu guanning de bianhua yu 
Zhongguo jiangtu de bianqian” (The concept of vassaldom during the Qing dynasty and the 
transformation of China’s frontiers), Qingshi yanjiu 4 (2006): 17-27; Bi Aonan, “Lishi yujing zhong de 
wangchao Zhongguo jiangyu gainian bianxi – yi tianxia, sihai, Zhongguo jiangyu, bantu wei li” (An analysis 
of imperial China’s concept of the frontier in historical context: ‘All Under Heaven’; ‘The Four Oceans’; 
‘The Middle Kingdom’; ‘Frontier Zones’; ‘Territory’ as keywords), Zhongguo bianjiang shide yanjiu 16.1 (2006): 
1-13; Zheng Wen, “Lun gudai Zhongguo de guojiaguan yu tianxia guan: bianjing yu bianjie xingcheng de 
lishi zuobiao” (Ancient China’s concept of state and empire: the historical coordinates of China’s borders), 
Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 17.3 (2007): 16-23; Liu Xiaoyuan, “Zhongguo de minzu, bianjiang wenti ji qi 
lingtu shuxing de jindai zhuanxing” (China’s national and border issues, and the modern transformation of 
its territoriality), in Li Xiaobing and Tian Xiansheng eds., Xifang shixue qianyan yanjiu pingxi (Research into 
the frontiers of Western historiography) (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2008), 1-23; Liu Xiaoyuan, 
“Chongsu Zhongguo xingzhuang: er zhan qijian Meiguo zhanlue siwei yu Zhongguo shaoshu minzu 
bianjiang” (Reconstructing China’s outlines: American strategy between the World Wars and China’s 
frontier national minorities), Lishi jiaoxue wenti 5 (2010): 15-20; Feng Jianyong, “Goumian minzu guojia: 
xinhai geming qianhou de Zhongguo bianjiang” (Constructing a nation-state: China’s frontiers before and 
after the 1911 Revolution), Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 21.3 (2011): 63-72; Li Dalong, “Shilun Zhongguo 
jiangyu xingcheng he fazhan de fenqi he tedian” (Phases and features of the development of China’s 
frontiers), Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 21.3 (2011): 22-32; Liu Xiaoyuan, “Bianjiang Zhongguo”; Zhu 
Zhaohua, “20 shiji wu liushi niandai xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de yuanze yu shijian,” 1-8. 
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After 1949, China’s government had to negotiate with newly independent nation-states, 
most of them former vassals of imperial China. Memory of imperial China’s claims to 
regional domination doubtless added to tensions in these nations’ border disputes with 
China.  
 Finally, the twelve states sharing land borders with China were politically very 
various: four were socialist, thus theoretically taking China’s side in the Cold War; the 
remaining eight were non-socialist, and some had sided with the US in its regional 
encirclement of China. During the Cold War, the resolution of China’s border disputes 
therefore also took on a powerful ideological dimension – particularly while Maoist 
China was working to export its revolution to its neighbours. 
 
 
Cold War China’s Initial Approach to Resolving Border Issues 
 
On 29 September 1949, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference approved as interim constitution the Common Programme. 
The Programme set out the following approach to foreign policy: “After careful 
investigation, every treaty or agreement signed between the Nationalist Government and 
foreign governments will either be recognised, abandoned, revised or reaffirmed.”11 The 
Common Programme did not make specific mention of border treaties, indicating that 
China’s new leadership had not yet recognised their particular importance in international 
law. Indeed, during the early years of the PRC, the leadership often seemed curiously 
vague in its approach to managing China’s borders. In the early 1950s, because of the 
lack of clarity over many existing borders and the leadership’s preoccupation with the 
Korean War, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tried, 
where possible, to postpone resolving border disputes with China’s neighbours.12 With 
regards to border treaties previously signed by the Nationalists, the new regime neither 
explicitly endorsed nor rejected such past agreements. Where it had inherited disputes 
from the Nationalists, it advocated a temporary preservation of the status quo. At the 
                                                        
11 Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selection of important documents since 1949) Volume 1 (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992), 13. 
12 The existence of numerous and diverse errors in maps of China published during this period is a good 
indication of the vagueness surrounding China’s borders. Examples of the mistakes highlighted by surveys 
carried out by the Ministries of Culture and of Foreign Affairs include: the placing of Kashmir within 
Indian territory; a lack of clarity over the borders between India, Bhutan and Sikkim; the placing of Nepal 
and Bhutan within Chinese territory; the designation of Indochina as Vietnam, and the outright omission 
of Laos and Cambodia. See Xuanchuan tongxun 172 (7 November 1955): 32-34.  
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same time, however, the Central Committee ordered relevant departments to conduct 
research into border conflicts, in the interests of resolving them in the future.13 We can 
tentatively conclude from this general reluctance to prioritise border issues that the CCP 
was unprepared for the legal complexities and rigours of governing a modern nation-
state.14 The Russian Communist Party, at a comparable point in its development, was 
more politically mature: within four years of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union 
set to resolving border conflicts inherited from the Tsarist government.15 
 When the early People’s Republic of China did apply itself to managing border 
disputes, it was largely pushed to do so by the other countries involved and was therefore 
unable to take the initiative in negotiations. By the mid-1950s, China adopted a foreign 
policy of “peaceful coexistence” with its neighbours, in the interests of creating a stable 
international environment for domestic economic reconstruction and of undermining US 
containment policy through winning support from more Asian and African nations. 
Consequently, the PRC now prioritised resolving any border issues that were creating 
tensions with neighbouring states. In April 1955, Zhou Enlai announced at the Bandung 
Conference that no foreign power had imported revolution into China, and that China 
likewise would not export its revolution beyond its borders.16 “China shares borders with 
twelve other countries; yet some of these borders have not been fully defined. As we 
work to confirm these borders with the nations concerned, we pledge to maintain the 
status quo, while acknowledging that the issue is awaiting resolution. We pledge to 
observe our borders: should a transgression take place, we will immediately acknowledge 
our mistake and retreat within our own borders. We will use only peaceful means to 
                                                        
13 See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de zhishi” (Central Party directive on the 
Sino-Burmese border issue), 31 October 1956, cited in Liao, “Ershi shiji wushi niandai Zhongguo chuli 
ludi bianjie wenti de yuanze ye banfa”. 
14 On the eve, and in the immediate aftermath, of the establishment of CCP authority over China, Mao 
Zedong made a serious attempt to release (Outer) Mongolia, Xinjiang and northeast China from Soviet 
control, to the point that he actually forced Stalin to make substantial concessions in the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
of Alliance. However, at that moment Mao’s key concern was recovering territory lost by the Nationalists, 
so that his compatriots would not interpret his “leaning to one side’ policy as supine submission to the 
USSR. It is hard to say, however, whether this strategy sprang from a proper understanding of the concept 
of territorial sovereignty as applied in modern nation-states. For further discussion, see Shen Zhihua, 
Wunai de xuanze: lengzhan yu Zhong-Su tongmeng de mingyun, 1945-49 (No choice: the Cold War and the fate of 
the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1945-59)) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxianchu, 2013), 102-105, 134-160. 
15 In 1920, the Soviet Union determined its border with Finland; in 1921, it signed a border treaty with 
Turkey. See Lingtu bianjie shiwu guoji tiaoyue he falü huibian (Compilation of international treaties and laws 
regarding territorial and border affairs) (Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe, 2006), 88-96, 12-16. 
16  Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Zhou Enlai’s selected diplomatic works) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian 
chubanshe, 1990), 123-124. 
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define our borders. If talks do not succeed at the first round, we will make a second 
attempt at negotiations, all the while maintaining the status quo.”17 
 Subsequent events pushed China to further expedite its resolution of disputed 
borders. In November 1955, following a misunderstanding, Chinese and Burmese border 
guards exchanged fire at Huangguoyuan.18 In February 1956, conflict developed within a 
Sino-Soviet joint defence team in a disputed border region in Yili, Xinjiang, with both 
sides firing warning shots.19 Discussion of border issues was thus promoted to the daily 
agenda of government business. On 16 March 1957, Zhou Enlai emphasised at the 
National Political Consultative Conference that maintaining the status quo on China’s 
borders was a stop-gap measure, and not a long-term policy.20 
 After conducting research into the history of the Sino-Burmese border, Zhou 
came up with a series of measures for resolving the border dispute with Burma.21 On 31 
October 1956, the Central Party Committee issued a “Directive on the Sino-Burmese 
Border”, and on 16 March and on 9 July 1957 Zhou presented reports on the issue.22 
These three policy statements set out the government’s broad approach to border issues, 
namely that disputes must be resolved in order to guarantee a stable international 
environment for China’s domestic economic reconstruction, to maintain peaceful 
relations with neighbouring countries (using negotiations and avoiding military action), 
and to exploit weaknesses in the imperialist blockade of China. China’s border policy 
must protect and promote the national interest, without being narrowly chauvinistic. In 
setting its boundaries, moreover, China would observe the conventions on borders laid 
                                                        
17 Ibid., 130. 
18 See Liu Jinjie, “Zhong-Mian bianji zhong de ‘Maikemahongxian’ wenti ji qi jiejue” (The problem of the 
McMahon Line within the Sino-Burmese border, and its resolution”, Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 1 (2006): 
91; Feng Yue and Qi Pengfei, “Zhong-Mian bianjie tanpan shulüe” (Summary of Sino-Burmese border 
negotiations), Hunan keji daxue xuebao 9.6 (2006): 55-60.  
19 “Yili Foreign Affairs Office Report on a Survey of the Sino-Soviet Border in the Yili Region,” 24 
September 1960, Yili Prefectural Archives, 11/1/134: 3-14. 
20 Yao Zhongming et al., “Zhou Enlai zongli jiejue Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de huihuang yeji (Zhou 
Enlai’s glorious record in resolving the China-Burma border question) in Pei Xianzhang ed., Yanjiu Zhou 
Enlai – waijiao sixiang yu shijian (Research on Zhou Enlai: foreign policy philosophy and practice) (Beijing: 
Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989), 95. 
21 On Zhou Enlai’s efforts to research and resolve the Sino-Burmese border problem, see Jin Chongji ed., 
Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai) Volume 2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 
1292-1324. 
22 The “Directive on the Sino-Burmese Border Issue” has never been published; see Liao Xinwen, op. cit., 
for a description of its contents; see also Gao Fei, “Jianping Zhongguo chuli lingtu zhengduan de yuanze ji 
linian”, 25-31. Zhou Enlai’s March report has also never been publicly released; for an outline of its 
contents see Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-76 (A chronology of Zhou Enlai 1949-76) Volume 2 (Beijing: 
Zhongyan wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 26. Zhou Enlai’s July report was covered in Renmin Ribao, 10 July 
1957, p. 1, and is also mentioned in Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 230-238. But this is not a verbatim record 
of the original speech; Liao Xinwen, “Ershi shiji wushi niandai Zhonguo” contains more of the original. 
Our own summary of the report is drawn from all these materials. 
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down by international law, which stipulated that when a country changes government, 
the new regime could choose to accept or reject all treaties with foreign states signed by 
the preceding administration except for agreements or clauses pertaining to borders. If the 
new government sought to change a border, it must first acknowledge the existing 
agreement before holding bilateral talks with the government in question. Arguments for 
border revision that cited distant historical precedent or rejected territorial concessions 
granted to imperialist powers, or that made appeals to nationalism or military interest, 
were both contrary to international law and unrealistic. 
 Borders inherited from the Nationalist government, and legal precedents drawn 
from late Qing and Republican treaties, would form the basis for all future negotiations; 
not a single inch of territory would be conceded. In conducting such talks, China’s new 
government would be historically informed, but look also to the future; the past would 
be reexamined from the perspective of China’s contemporary situation. Finally, China 
would seek to safeguard relations with its neighbours during any ensuing border talks, 
striving to resolve issues on a basis of equality, mutual interest and friendship. 
 Under the direction of Zhou Enlai, therefore, the Chinese government’s initial 
approach to resolving border issue was both moderate and realistic. Zhou suggested 
concentrating on the dispute with Burma first, then aiming to confirm other borders 
over the ensuing five to ten years.23   
 On 25 April 1958, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communiqué to 
border provinces, explaining the crucial importance of resolving border disputes with 
China’s neighbours and requesting that each province should appoint specialists to 
conduct preparatory research, focusing on disputed or unconfirmed borders.24 
On 12 July, the State Council’s Office of Foreign Affairs set up a Borders 
Committee, bringing together representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Defence, The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Academy of Sciences, the State 
Commission for Ethnic Affairs, the National Survey Department and the General Staff 
Headquarters. The Committee would be responsible for drawing up borders, for 
commissioning surveys and other relevant research, and for devising plans for 
negotiations. At the Committee’s first meeting, it was pointed out that over the past few 
years “both small- and large-scale disputes had arisen” along China’s 13,000-kilometre-
                                                        
23 Guangxi Zhuang Nationality Autonomous Region Archive, X50/2/290, 5-10; Yao Zhongming et al., 
“Zhou Enlai zongli”: 94, 110; Zhou Enlai’s speech given at the Historical Geography Conference, 7 
August 1957, accessed through private collection. 
24 “Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué on border issues”, 25 April 1958, Jilin Provincial Archive, 
77/4/1, 15-16. 
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long borders with socialist countries, “which had had a negative impact on living and 
working conditions on both sides of the borders in question, and also on friendly 
relations with the nations concerned.” The Committee proposed to “resolve the Sino-
Mongolian border in 1958, and border issues with the Soviet Union, Vietnam and North 
Korea the following year.” Half of China’s 7,235-kilometre-long borders with capitalist 
countries, meanwhile, had not been defined. The Committee projected that the borders 
with (in the following order) Burma, India, Afghanistan and Kashmir would be agreed 
within two to three years; all further outstanding issues would be cleared up within five 
to ten years.25 
On 8 August, the State Council instructed each frontier province to organise a 
Borders Sub-Committee, responsible for all local work on border issues. 26  On 13 
December, the CCP Central Committee issued a “Directive on Improving Border Work”, 
personally approved by Zhou Enlai. It emphasized that China was contending with both 
pre- and post-Liberation border conflicts. Boundary lines were often ambiguous and 
deficiencies in the government’s understanding of border issues were hindering both 
national security and diplomacy. China’s border problems, furthermore, concerned both 
China and its neighbours, and hence required a bilateral, objective approach. The 
government should prepare as extensively as possible for future negotiations; should the 
conditions or the imperative arise to resolve a particular border question, China should 
be ready to take the initiative in talks. Provincial and district party committees in regions 
bordering on non-socialist nations should prioritise work on border questions.27 
It seems clear that the Chinese government had not anticipated any serious 
difficulties in its border negotiations with non-socialist countries. As long as it prepared 
diligently, it felt, all issues would be resolved within five to ten years. The government 
was even less worried about its borders with socialist nations: a maximum of three years 
would be necessary to resolve any issues arising.  
In the course of the next two years, however, Sino-Indian relations dramatically 
deteriorated, China openly split with the Soviet Union and tensions emerged in the 
PRC’s relations with most of its neighbours. These developments shook China’s new 
border policy to its very foundations. 
                                                        
25  “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on the Borders Committee’s Work”, 16 July 1958, Guangxi 
Autonomous Region Archives, X50/2/290, 5-10. 
26 “State Council Circular on the Organisation of Border Work”, 8 August 1958, Guangxi Autonomous 
Region Archive, X50/2/290, 4. 
27  “Central Party Committee Directive on Intensifying Border Work”, 13 December 1958, Guangxi 
Autonomous Region Archive, X50/2/258, 37-38; Zhou Enlai nianpu Volume 2, 194. 
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By 1960, the PRC’s border dispute with India had been ongoing for the best part 
of a decade. In 1951, India deployed forces in Mendawang, on the Sino-Indian border; 
around 1953, it deployed soldiers again in the zone to the south of the McMahon line; 
after 1954, it occupied several border zones within Chinese territory and ignored Chinese 
attempts at negotiation. In 1955, Sino-Indian relations improved, with both sides 
advocating peaceful coexistence. China hoped that the Indian government would assist 
in resolving the Tibet problem, while Nehru tried to persuade Zhou Enlai to 
acknowledge the McMahon Line. In the interests of uniting the country and stabilizing 
the situation in Tibet, in 1957 Zhou Enlai conditionally accepted India’s view. However, 
when China was unable to solve the Tibet issue as it had hoped, resolution of the Sino-
Indian border issue was also shelved. 28 While suppressing the Tibetan uprising in 1959, 
Chinese forces pursued fleeing rebels to the frontier with India; Indian society responded 
with visceral denunciations of Chinese military action, while Nehru granted refuge to the 
Dalai Lama. Nonetheless, as tensions proliferated, the Chinese government and Zhou 
still strove to resolve the border dispute, in the interests of stabilizing the frontier. At the 
second national-level Foreign Affairs Meeting held in March 1959, a spokesman from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for “diligent implementation of the government border 
plan. We must carry out more survey work and come up with solutions.” China’s borders 
with India and Burma were top priority; managing borders with socialist countries, it was 
anticipated, would “pose relatively little difficulty”.29  
In early 1960, in an attempt to take the initiative in future negotiations, the 
Standing Committee of the Central Party Committee’s Political Department convened 
several policy-making meetings during which the history of China’s border disputes with 
India and other neighbouring countries was extensively discussed. If border disputes 
with Burma, Nepal, and Laos were to be speedily resolved, the conference concluded, 
compromises would have to be made by both sides. In the case of India, China would 
need to hold further talks and offer further concessions, if the problem were to be 
resolved peacefully. (Indeed, China’s perceptions of and plans to resolve the Sino-Indian 
dispute, in combination with the instability in Tibet, influenced its approach to border 
issues with countries such as Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal. For example, 
                                                        
28 See Yang Gongsu, “Zhong-Yin bianjie wenti de lishi zhenxiang” (The historical reality behind the Sino-
Indian border issue), Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu baogao 4 (May 1989): 1-13; Dai Chaowu, Zhongguo yu 
Yindu de guanxi (1950-1965): jiyu duoguo jiemi dangan de yanjiu (Sino-Indian Relations (1950-1965): Research 
Drawn from International Declassified Archives) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, forthcoming). 
29 Luo Guibo’s speech given at the Second Foreign Affairs Meeting, 4 March 1959, Guangxi Autonomous 
Region Archives, X50/3/6, 99-120. 
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through negotiations with Burma, discussed below, China was able to state its position 
on issues such as the McMahon Line, and hoped to demonstrate to India that border 
disputes could be resolved through talks.) China’s border problems with North Korea 
and Mongolia were, it was judged, altogether less intractable. Given the ongoing war in 
Vietnam and the escalation of the Sino-Soviet split, border issues with both countries 
required resolution, though again these cases were seen as less urgent.30 
On 14 March 1960, the State Council Borders Committee stated that in 1959 
border questions had become the PRC’s most pressing diplomatic concern; the boundary 
conflict with India, already the cause of two armed clashes and attracting global attention, 
was the most critical. Pakistan and South Vietnam had also provoked a number of small-
scale border incidents, which imperialists, revisionists and counter-revolutionaries “were 
exploiting to malign and isolate us.” The news was not all bad, however. Burma had 
devised a plan for solving its border disputes with China, and Nepal had sent a 
delegation to China to discuss the principles of a border agreement. China’s borders with 
socialist states were basically stable, though not entirely unproblematic. Some boundary 
disputes, for example with the USSR or Vietnam, had never been resolved, but had not 
yet become critical; the lack of clarity over the border with North Korea and the failure 
to implement a border agreement with Mongolia were presenting some minor problems. 
Border survey work in 1959 had focused on India, for obvious reasons, with surveys of 
other borders consequently postponed. Where surveys needed to be carried out on 
borders with socialist countries, the Borders Committee requested that where formal 
talks had not begun, such work “should be carried out secretly…to avoid unsettling 
communities living on the borders”. The Committee, it seems, was beginning to 
understand the complexity of border questions and anticipated that “in the course of the 
next year, there will be severe border conflicts with capitalist countries.” However, it also 
predicted that, beyond a few minor issues, no serious conflicts would arise with socialist 
countries.31  
In sum, then, the government’s initial approach to border disputes (to resolve 
them by the principles of “Peaceful Coexistence” and in accordance with international 
law) was reasonable and pragmatic. But it must be underlined that the government’s key 
                                                        
30  Wu Lengxi, Shinian lun zhan (1956-1966) (Ten years of talking about war (1956-1966)) (Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 248. Due to restrictions on space, this article will not discuss the 
details of Beijing’s complex reasons for its handling of border issues with these states. For further 
elaboration, please refer to works of secondary literature listed in footnotes.  
31 “Summary and Plan of Work for the State Council’s Border Committee (1959-60)”, 14 March 1960, 
Guangxi Autonomous Region Archives, X50/3/37, 85-89. 
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strategic objectives in border negotiations were to weaken the US encirclement of China 
and to improve relations with neighbouring states – not to defend China’s territorial 
sovereignty. As a result, in almost all its bilateral border negotiations during the 1950s 
and 1960s, China either offered or felt forced to made concessions, in the hope of 
obtaining these objectives. Furthermore, as the international situation, and China’s 
domestic and foreign policy objectives changed, the government’s initial moderate 
approach became untenable and in some cases was discarded altogether. 
 
 
Outcomes of China’s Management of Border Disputes 
 
Between 1957 and 1962, China’s domestic and foreign policy underwent fundamental 
transformations. At home, with the intensification of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao 
Zedong re-emphasised class struggle. Despite the temporary resurfacing of a more 
moderate line in the early 1960s, from 1962 Mao began calling for economic 
reconstruction to be sidelined by political campaigns and preparations for war. In foreign 
policy, the PRC advocated waging proxy “wars on the peripheries” with the United 
States, “exporting revolution” to neighbouring states, while attacking Soviet “revisionism” 
and vying for the leadership of world communism.32  
Against this backdrop of oscillating political moderation and radicalization, of 
internal economic crisis (caused by the failure of the Great Leap Forward) and external 
insecurity (caused by ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, and tensions with India and Taiwan) the 
Chinese government’s efforts to resolve border conflicts led to two kinds of outcomes. 
Some borders were drawn up through diplomatic negotiations in which China offered 
substantial concessions in order to stabilize its borders: with Burma (October 1960); 
Nepal (October 1961); North Korea (October 1962); Mongolia (December 1962); 
                                                        
32 See Niu Jun, “1962: Zhongguo duiwai zhengce ‘zuo’ zhuan de qianye” (1962: the eve of China’s ‘left 
turn’ in foreign policy), Lishi yanjiu 3 (2003): 23-40; Lin Yunhui, Wutuobang yundong: cong dayuejin dao dajihuang 
(1958-61) (A utopian movement: from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Famine (1958-61)) (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008); Chen Jian, “Geming yu weiji de niandai: dayuejin he 
Zhongguo duiwai zhengce de gemingxing zhuanbian” (In an age of revolution and crisis: the Great Leap 
Forward and the revolutionary turn in China’s foreign policy) Lengzhan guoji shi yanjiu 7 (Winter 2008): 45-
96; Shen Zhihua ed., Zhong-Su guanxi shigang: 1917-1991 nian Zhong-Su guanxi ruogan wenti zai tantao (An 
outline of Sino-Soviet relations: an investigation into various problems in Sino-Soviet relations 1917-1991) 
(Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 206-374. On the subject of the CCP’s early efforts to 
instigate Asian revolution and its abandonment of its policy of exporting revolution in 1954-1955, see Shen 
Zhihua, “Mao Zedong yu dongfang qingbaoju – Yazhou geming zhudaoquan de zhuanyi” (Mao Zedong 
and the Eastern Intelligence Bureau: the transfer of leadership in the Asian revolution), Huadong shifan 
daxue xuebao 6 (2011): 27-37. 
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Pakistan (March 1963); and Afghanistan (November 1963). At the same time, however, 
some unresolved border disputes led to military clashes, most notably the Sino-Indian 
War, which broke out in October 1962. Although a ceasefire was quickly called, the 
territorial dispute rumbles on today. In August 1964, China’s border negotiations with 
the Soviet Union broke down; in March 1969, military clashes took place on the Sino-
Soviet border. In October that year, border negotiations were resumed, though the issue 
was never satisfactorily resolved. 
 China’s border dispute with Burma was complex. Both sides had unresolved 
territorial claims. In the early years of the People’s Republic, estimates of the area of 
territory disputed by both sides varied between 10,000 and 180,000 square kilometres. 
But by the time that the Chinese and Burmese government began talks in November 
1956, the area of controversial territory had been reduced to 1,909 square kilometres. 
When talks concluded in 1960, China had gained only 18% of the disputed territory (and 
these were areas that had in any case historically always belonged to China). Most 
importantly, PRC negotiators gave up the rights that the 1941 agreement had given 
China to exploit Burma’s mineral deposits. Additionally, because the PRC accepted a 
British proposal to use natural frontiers as the border, the northern leg of the new Sino-
Burmese border now coincided with the (previously contested) 1914 McMahon Line. 
This acquiescence not only signalled that the PRC government had renounced China’s 
territorial claims – upheld by the Qing dynasty and, for the previous half-century, the 
Republic of China – to territory along the Irrawaddy River, but also that the Chinese 
were willing to accept (at least in part) the McMahon Line. The terms of China’s 
agreement with Burma held to the moderate policy of accepting existing treaties, but 
abandoned the principle of “not conceding a single inch of territory”. The treaty 
generated much contemporary discontent, including among leading representatives of 
Yunnan’s national minorities, whom the government had to work hard to soothe. China 
had made such major concessions principally in order to establish friendly relations, and 
to sign a non-aggression treaty, with Burma, to undermine the US blockade and to gain 
Burma’s assistance in fighting remnant Nationalist forces based on the border between 
Yunnan and Burma. The treaty was also designed to be a public expression of China’s 
sincerity and moderation in foreign policy, in the hope that it would ease China’s border 
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disputes with other nation-states (especially India), in the context of ongoing unrest in 
Tibet.33 
 Before signing the border agreement, the Chinese government had perceived that 
“Burma was willing to expedite the resolution of the border question, but was far less 
enthusiastic about concluding treaties of friendship…Ne Win wants us to accept his plan 
for the border before he will agree to visit China”. Because of China’s anxiety to stabilise 
the situation on its peripheries, it accepted Burma’s terms.34 But things did not work out 
as China hoped. In the short-term, the border treaty did improve relations with Burma. 
But within only two years, in February 1962, Ne Win launched a successful military coup, 
to see off pressure from the United States and suppress the increasingly activist Burmese 
Communist Party. In this context, the Burmese government grew increasingly anxious 
about Communist China. Despite strenuous efforts by China to maintain the status quo, 
bilateral relations broke down completely in June 1967.35 And the precedent of the Sino-
Burmese treaty had a negative, complicating impact on China’s subsequent border 
negotiations with Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was, arguably, one of the key 
reasons that the Chinese government was forced to make yet more concessions in later 
talks. 
 On the Sino-Nepalese border, eleven separate territories were disputed, covering 
a total of 2,476 square kilometres. As talks proceeded, China grew conscious that Nepal 
was “seeking to grab opportunities to occupy land wherever possible, to seize hold of 
disputed territories and refuse to return them”; “It wants us to make many concessions.” 
But the PRC ultimately caved in. When a treaty was signed in October 1961, China 
ended up with only 6% of the disputed territory. 36  This was not an outcome that 
reflected a spirit of mutual compromise. Again, China’s stance was influenced by anxiety 
                                                        
33 See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyueji, Zhong-Mian juan (Collected border treaties of the PRC: 
China and Burma), 1-13; United Front Department ed., Lingxun 13 (1960), 1-5; 14 (1960), 5-7; Waishi 
dongtai 57 (1960), 10-11; Wang Shilu, “Zhong-Mian bianji tiaoyue moshi dui jiejue Zhong-Yin bianjie wenti 
de yingxiang” (The form of the Sino-Burmese border treaty and its influence on the Sino-Indian border 
issue), Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu baogao 3-4 (1993): 37-48; Zhu Zhaohua, Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti yanjiu, 
275-286 and “Xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de dianfan”: 73-76; Chen Saixi, “Lun zhongguo jiejue 
bianjie zhengduan de moshi” (On China’s model for resolving border disputes), Guangdong waiyu waimao 
daxue xuebao 20.3 (May 2009): 46-50; Fan Hongwei, “Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de jiejue,” 36-45; Fravel, 
Strong Borders, 90, 329-330. 
34 Waishi dongtai 63 (1959), 9; 1 (1960), 2; 3 (1960), 4. 
35 Wang Taiping ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi (1957-69) (Diplomatic History of the PRC, 1957-69) 
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about unrest in Tibet (in 1960, after preliminary agreement had been reached, Nepal 
permitted Chinese strikes against Tibetan rebels in Nepal) and by a desire “to build 
momentum for a similar settlement with India.”37 
 The territory disputed by China and Pakistan was in Kashmir: from a legal 
perspective, while the question of Kashmir’s sovereignty remained unresolved, China 
and Pakistan had no shared border. Nonetheless, in February 1960 Pakistan proposed 
border talks, but China played for time. In February 1962, due to political changes in 
Pakistan and in the interests of intensifying the antagonism between Pakistan on the one 
hand, and the US and India on the other, the Chinese government finally signaled its 
willingness to begin border talks. The talks focused on 8,806 square kilometres of 
disputed territory, 7,252 square kilometres (82%) of which were under de-facto Chinese 
control. After agreement was reached, China still occupied 60% of the disputed 
territories but had ceded 1,942 square kilometres of the land it had once controlled, while 
Pakistan relinquished only a small part of its territorial claims.38 In the course of the 
negotiations, therefore, China lost its previously dominant position. Yet again, China 
hoped to signal to India that “conducting peaceful consultations on the basis of mutual 
respect and goodwill is an effective way of solving international disputes.”39 
 China’s border with Afghanistan was very short (only 92 kilometres) and 
undefined by treaty. Negotiations between the two countries began in June 1963; 
agreement was reached after only two weeks, with China agreeing to uphold the existing, 
conventional line. In November, when the treaty was signed, all disputed territories were 
ceded to Afghanistan (7,281 square kilometres in total). 40  China thus carelessly 
relinquished another set of historical claims to frontier zones. The agreement with 
Afghanistan, the leader of the Chinese negotiating delegation commented, “will become 
another example for all neighbouring countries to settle problems between them 
peacefully through negotiations.”41 But the PRC was to make even greater concessions 
on its northern borders with North Korea and Mongolia. 
                                                        
37 Fravel, Strong Borders, 91-92. 
38 See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyueji, Zhong-A, Zhong-Ba juan (Collected border treaties of the 
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Since the Ming and early Qing dynasties, China’s major border dispute with 
Korea had centred on the Jiangyuan region near the Tumen River. The Gando 
Convention of 1909 had allocated to Qing China parts of the Changbai mountain range, 
including Heaven Lake on Paektu Mountain, even though the Koreans had long 
considered this to be their most sacred mountain. Until early 1960, the Chinese 
government seemed outwardly unconcerned by the uncertainty surrounding the Sino-
Korean border: the existence of the Gando Convention, it was assumed, would prevent 
the eruption of any major disputes. The PRC was also confident that solutions could be 
found to a host of more minor border quibbles (caused, for example, by boundary rivers 
changing course). In reality, the Chinese government had anticipated that drawing a 
border through the Changbai mountain range might generate intractable disputes. To 
avoid adversely affecting relations with North Korea, the Chinese government decided 
for the time being to concentrate on subsidiary issues, without coming to an integrated 
solution.  
In 1959, North Korea’s leadership stated that “for the time being, it was not the 
right moment to resolve” the border problem, perhaps assessing that they would not 
achieve their desired objectives at that point. Although China wanted further discussions 
of the border at the time, it acquiesced in the postponement of the issue. In February 
1962 – taking advantage of China’s economic weakness and international isolation, 
following the Sino-Soviet split and worsening tensions with India – North Korea 
suddenly asked to settle the issue through secret negotiations, anticipating that China 
would be more compliant. China immediately agreed, in the hope of winning North 
Korea’s support in the dispute with the USSR, and in April of that year bilateral talks 
began. Because China had underestimated the magnitude of the problem, it was under-
prepared for negotiations and was outmanoeuvred by North Korean proposals. But 
because it saw North Korea as a comrade nation, the PRC felt that the Sino-Korean 
border was an “internal” rather than an “external” matter, and took a correspondingly 
relaxed approach. Six months later, China and North Korea agreed a 1,334-kilometre-
long border that included the Changbai range, together with islands and sandbanks in the 
Yalu and Tumen Rivers. As a result, China renounced its claims to the stipulations of the 
Gando Convention and basically accepted all North Korea’s territorial demands. A large 
stretch of territory within the Changbai mountain range was ceded to North Korea; 54.5% 
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of Heaven Lake (almost 10 square kilometres) was also granted to North Korea.42 When 
it came to deciding jurisdiction over border rivers, the treaty ignored the conventions of 
international law (drawing the border along the mid-point of the main channel) but 
instead stipulated that both sides would have joint possession and joint administration. 
Of the 451 islands and sand banks in the river, China took 187, while North Korea 
received 264. The agreement over the territorial sea beyond the mouth of the Yalu river 
also favoured North Korea.43 
 In August 1945, China and the Soviet Union acknowledged the immediate 
independence of Mongolia and the current border. However, neither side carried out a 
survey of the border zone or produced a map confirming the line. After 1949, Sino-
Mongolian relations were regularly plagued by border disputes and in 1956, Mongolia 
took over 720 square kilometres of disputed territory previously occupied by China. 
After talks, the two sides decided to resolve the issue diplomatically. Consequently, 
however, Mongolia increased its demands. In July 1958, it insisted on a new border that 
far exceeded the line agreed in 1945 and that would expand Mongolia’s existing territory 
by a total of 43,876 square kilometres (of which Mongolia had already occupied some 
17,490 square kilometres). At the same time, Mongolia stepped up pressure on the Altay 
region, in north Xinjiang, harassing Chinese border populations and forcibly occupying 
Chinese territory. The Chinese government tolerated all these provocations. The 
Mongolians then demanded the fastest possible resolution of the border issues between 
the two countries. China began surveying the border zone in 1958, but in April 1962 still 
felt that more time was needed to research fully the history of the frontier. But as Sino-
Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, China felt it had no choice but to conciliate 
Mongolia by accepting its demands, also hoping that a negotiated settlement would, in 
the words of Liu Shaoqi, help China “settle its boundary question with other socialist 
countries on the basis of the same principles” (presumably referring to the USSR).44 In 
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October 1962, China and Mongolia began talks in Ulan Bator and concluded a treaty by 
December. In the course of the negotiations, China relinquished most of its demands 
that Mongolia should return territory that it had forcibly occupied; China received only 
35% of the 16,808 square kilometres of disputed territory.45 This outcome strayed far 
from the PRC’s initial insistence that existing lines of jurisdiction should form the basis 
of border negotiations and on “not conceding a single inch of territory”. 
 In making such huge concessions to North Korea and Mongolia, China’s aim 
was to win their support in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and also to hasten the resolution of 
the border disputes with India and the Soviet Union. But their policy of munificence 
accomplished neither objective. While North Korea was striving to recover Mount 
Paektu, it assiduously courted China and cold-shouldered the Soviet Union, even to the 
point of openly criticizing the latter. But the Koreans were fickle: two years later, 
following Khruschev’s fall, the Soviet Union began successfully wooing North Korea 
back. After China’s radically leftward turn during the Cultural Revolution, an open rift 
developed between China and North Korea.46 Historically, Mongolia had relied heavily 
on the Soviet Union for support. During the Sino-Soviet Split, it briefly took up a neutral 
position, but only to obtain short-term benefits from China. On the very evening that 
the Sino-Mongolian border treaty was signed, the visiting Mongolian leader Yumjaagiin 
Tsedenbal sat down to an explosive evening of talks with Zhou Enlai. When Zhou 
mentioned the Sino-Soviet Split, Tsedenbal declared his unswerving support for the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After the meeting, Tsedenbal openly told his 
                                                        
45 See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyueji, Zhong-Meng juan (Collected Border Treaties of the PRC: 
China and Mongolia), 1-2, 152-198; “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report on Border Negotiations with the 
Mongolian government,” 31 December 1957, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives, 252/1/51, 6-
11; Luo Guibo’s speech at the Second Foreign Affairs Work Conference, 4 March 1959, Guangxi 
Archives, X50/3/6, 99-120; “Views of the Aletai Prefectural Commissioner’s Office on the Checking of 
the Sino-Mongolian Border and the Surveying of the Sino-Soviet Border,” 7 June 1959, Xinjiang Yili 
Hasake Autonomous Prefectural Archives, 11/1/74, 27-28; Jiangsu Provincial Archives, 3124-0139, 5-22; 
Waishi dongtai 76 (1959): 3-4; 87 (1959): 3-4; Xinjiang Weiwuer Autonomous Region Gazetteer Editorial 
Committee, Xinjiang tongzhi: waishizhi (Xinjiang Gazetteer: foreign affairs section) (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin 
chubanshe, 1995), 233-236, 266-268; Wang, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi Volume 2, 100-102; Aletai 
diquzhi (Altay Prefecture Gazetteer) (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004), 945-947; Nei Menggu 
zizhiquzhi: waishizhi (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Gazetteer: foreign affairs section) (Hohhot: 
Yuanfang chubanshe, 2009), 109-110; Fravel, Strong Borders, 110-112. 
46  Bernd Schaefer, “North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow，1966-1972”，CWIHP 
Working Paper 44 (October 2004): 2-3; Chang Xiaohe, “‘Zhuyi’ yu ‘anquan’ zhi zheng: liushiniandai 
Chaoxian yu Zhong-Su guanxi de yanbian” (The struggle between ‘isms’ and ‘security’: the evolution of 
Korean and Sino-Soviet relations through the 1960s), Waijiao pinglun 2 (2009): 21-35; Shimotomai Nobuo, 
“Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing，1956-1972,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., The 
Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991 (Washington and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 122-151. 
 21 
entourage that the signing of the border treaty would not improve Mongolia’s relations 
with China.47  
Both Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations, meanwhile, reached a dead-end in 
the course of border negotiations of the 1950s and 1960s. Sino-Indian tensions steadily 
intensified after China’s suppression in 1959 of the Tibetan uprising. India adopted an 
aggressive, forward policy, while China strove to maintain the status quo. After the initial 
outbreak of hostilities, China voluntarily withdrew its forces twenty kilometres behind 
the border and proposed negotiations. Visiting India in April 1960, Zhou Enlai offered 
various concessions in the hope of a peaceful, stable resolution of the frontier dispute: 
India, he suggested, could occupy 90,000 square kilometres south of the McMahon Line, 
while China would take the 33,000-square-kilometre Aksai Chin district on the western 
stretch of the McMahon Line. India responded with greater aggression, until in October 
1962, the Sino-Indian War broke out, at a time of heightening radicalisation of China’s 
domestic and foreign policy. After securing military victory, the Chinese government 
called for a ceasefire and again withdrew its army twenty kilometres behind the de-facto 
border of 1959. But negotiations were stalemated by the Indian government’s refusal of 
China’s demands.48 China at the time was more preoccupied by its eastern than by its 
western front and was optimistic that the straightforward exercise of forbearance would 
stabilise the border with India. The opposite ensued. When China gave an inch, India’s 
government responded by taking a mile. The latter’s overbearing stance sprang in part 
from the pressure that the Indian rightwing was putting Nehru under at the time. But 
Indian aggression was also encouraged by China’s earlier, apparently open-handed 
approach to border issues; India’s foreign policy-makers concluded that tough-talking 
would reap dividends; ultimately, it pushed China into military action. After 1960, Mao’s 
own increasingly radical foreign policy had condemned the Indian government as 
“reactionary”, thereby ruling out any further territorial concessions.   
Although China had a long history of border disputes with Russia/the Soviet 
Union, both sides avoided the issue during the 1950s, the golden age of Sino-Soviet 
relations. When in 1958, China took steps to resolve the border question, Sino-Soviet 
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relations were already under strain and fresh border conflicts were not slow to develop. 
China’s own position on border negotiations also took on a tougher, ideological 
dimension. Even before specific issues could be discussed, China wanted the Soviet 
Union to acknowledge that all previous treaties had been “Unequal Treaties”. In 
February 1964, when Sino-Soviet border negotiations formally began, the first two 
rounds of talks bogged down in meaningless ideological debates; it was not until the third 
session that either side began discussing practical problems. But because both sides 
agreed to follow international law in drawing the border along the mid-point of the main 
channel of border rivers, the eastern border question was quickly resolved, except for the 
issue of jurisdiction over the Bolshoi Ussuriisk Island in the Amur River. The Soviet 
Union also agreed, on the strength of this principle, to cede to China some 400 disputed 
islands (including Zhenbao – Danansky – Island) and 600 square kilometres of disputed 
waters; an island of about 200 square kilometres in the Argun River was also ceded to 
China. However, on 10 July – while the Soviet delegation was relaxing in Beidaihe, 
during a break in negotiations – Mao Zedong told a Japanese Socialist Party delegation 
that he still wanted to settle accounts with the Soviet Union over Russian occupation of 
Chinese territory a century earlier, and raised the question of China recovering (Outer) 
Mongolia. Mao’s comments destroyed the hard-won harmony of the ongoing border 
negotiations: the Soviet delegation broke off talks halfway through and returned home.49 
Naturally, Mao Zedong had no real intention of reclaiming Chinese territory lost to the 
Tsarist government; he just wanted to infuriate Khruschev. His plan was deliberately to 
sabotage Sino-Soviet border negotiations, to ensure that relations with the USSR did not 
improve. He needed the USSR to remain a target of revisionism, to be struggled against 
in his Cultural Revolution. For Mao, it seems, the Sino-Soviet border issue was little 
more than a tool in a broader ideological conflict.50 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The PRC State Council’s initial, moderate approach to resolving border disputes in the 
early Cold War period was over time discarded or (in certain cases) never implemented. 
In every treaty signed through negotiations, China (to a greater or lesser extent) made 
                                                        
49 See Li, “Zhengzhi doushi yu dishou”. 
50 For more details on Mao’s desire to challenge the Soviet Communist Party for the leadership of global 
communism, see Shen, Wunai de xuanze, 637-657. 
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concessions. The only treaty in which China won concessions (the draft Sino-Soviet 
border agreement) was never ratified because Mao deliberately sabotaged it.  
There are two broad explanations for this policy failure. Firstly, negotiations took 
place at a highly unpropitious moment for China. China focused on border issues 
between 1960 and 1963, at a time of domestic economic crisis and international 
diplomatic setbacks. China’s relative internal and external weakness meant that it was 
unable to take the initiative in border talks. Secondly, China’s principal objective in 
holding border talks was to obtain security and friendship on its peripheries through 
offering territorial concessions. In other words, it was focused not on protecting and 
enhancing national sovereignty, but rather on easing diplomatic difficulties. It hoped to 
barter territory for favourable foreign policy outcomes. 
 This was in some ways an understandable strategy. But there were two 
prerequisites for its success. Was this approach in harmony with China’s long-range 
national interests? And what guarantees did China have that offering territorial 
concessions would maintain long-term security and friendship on its peripheries? If you 
sell-out long-term interests for short-term gains and, in so doing, encourage 
intransigence in antagonist nations, such a strategy will fail. As Lord Palmerston put it: 
“Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” While 
the international environment remains unfavourable, a nation is best off postponing the 
resolution of border disputes. China enjoyed much greater success when it managed to 
sideline direct discussion of sovereignty issues: consider, for example, its handling of the 
Diaoyu question with Japan in the 1970s,51 or again the peaceful border agreements that 
China signed in the 1990s with India and Bhutan.52 
 China’s handling of border policy in the early Cold War was also weakened by its 
leadership’s inadequate understanding of the fundamental principles involved. When 
considering territorial issues, China’s leaders often failed to behave like rulers of a 
modern nation-state. Their thinking was influenced by, on the one hand, the imperial 
ideal of China comprising “all under heaven” and, on the other, the imported Marxist 
theory of “world revolution”. 
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 In October 1935, Mao Zedong, in his poem “Kunlun”, revealed the historical 
imprint of imperial China’s vague, universalist approach to territoriality on his own 
political thought: 
 
To Kunlun now I say, 
Neither all your height 
Nor all your snow is needed. 
Could I but draw my sword o’ertopping heaven, 
I’d cleave you in three: 
One piece for Europe, 
One for America, 
One to keep in the East. 
Peace would then reign over the world, 
The same warmth and cold throughout the globe.53 
 
After he became leader of China, the romantic imprecision about borders that Mao 
expressed in this poem came to shape practical policy. To see this in action, consider 
Mao’s own comments about the Sino-Korean and Sino-Indian border disputes. 
 On 25 November 1958, Mao told Kim Il-sung (who was visiting China at the 
time) that “historically, China has not behaved well towards North Korea; our ancestors 
treated your ancestors badly…[If your ancestors could speak to you now] they would say 
that the Liao River used to be Korea’s border, but now the Chinese have pushed you 
[Kim Il-song] back to the Yalu.” When Kim Il-sung visited Beijing again at the end of 
May 1963, Mao told him that he saw all of China’s northeast as North Korea’s strategic 
hinterland. Once war broke out again, Mao would make it entirely over to Comrade Kim, 
to “be ruled as one territory”.54 
 While Zhou Enlai rushed to deal with the 1959 military crisis on the Sino-Indian 
border, Mao in November of that year received the General Secretary of the Indian 
communist party and a delegation sent by the Indian communist party. The conversation 
got onto the subject of the Sino-Indian border conflict. Once the Indian People have 
                                                        
53 Mao Tsetung, Poems (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), 20-21. 
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seized power, Mao told his visitors, China will not only acknowledge the McMahon Line, 
but will also cede 90,000 square kilometres south of the line to India.55 
 Such remarks recall the open-handed attitude of Chinese emperors to their 
frontier territories. In 1728, the King of Annan petitioned for 120 li of territory that he 
was disputing with the Chinese province of Yunnan. The Yongzheng emperor granted 
him 80 li, but the king was still not satisfied. “We control the entire universe,” 
Yongzheng responded a little testily. “Since Annan is registered as one of our vassal 
states, every square foot of it belongs to us. Why are they quibbling about forty li?” But 
when he learnt that the King “having regretted his transgression, was respectfully 
awaiting imperial orders” and had presented a memorial affirming his loyalty, Yongzheng 
softened his tone: “If these forty li are part of Yunnan, they are our inner territory; if 
they are part of Annan, they count as our outer territory. What is the difference?” With a 
few strokes of his writing brush, he gifted all the disputed land to the King of Annan.56  
Mao’s flexible attitude to territorial sovereignty seems remarkably similar to that 
of Yongzheng, fluidly merging the idea of a universal Chinese empire with the theory of 
proletarian world revolution. Marxist theory holds that the revolution will succeed first in 
a few advanced countries, then spread outward. In the course of the revolution, the 
machinery of the state will be smashed; the individual states in which the proletariat live 
will naturally wither away.57 To the leader of a genuinely Marxist party, the state is only a 
temporary phenomenon that will shortly be swept aside by world revolution. By the end 
of this process, one of the key defining features of a state – its borders – will become 
meaningless. Proletarian “internationalism” cannot coexist with capitalist “nationalism”. 
 And it was the theory of permanent world revolution that dominated Mao-era 
China’s foreign policy; “peaceful coexistence” was no more than a short-term strategy of 
the 1950s. At the same time as China was publicly seeking to stabilise relations with its 
neighbours through treaties and territorial concessions, its government was continually 
exporting revolution, encouraging and aiding anti-governmental armed struggles in 
neighbouring states. This intense inconsistency between official and unofficial policy 
inevitably generated tensions and ambiguities in China’s dealings with its peripheries. 
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 In short, within the Chinese “empire” (which after 1949 became one of the 
centres of world revolution), borders had never been a major issue – in fact, they barely 
existed. If a state was submissive to the “celestial empire” (or – to use post-1949 
terminology – supported the world revolution), it could be granted any amount of 
territory because it was part of the “celestial empire” (or the world revolution). This was 
perhaps why in 1957 the Chinese government so casually gave Bach Long Vi Island to 
Vietnam, its “comrade and brother”; why in 1959 Mao Zedong told the Indian 
Communist Party that the “McMahon Line” had no significance to him; why in 1962 the 
Chinese leadership considered that its border talks with North Korea were an “internal” 
rather than an “external” matter. The greatest challenge that Mao-era China faced in 
defining the country’s borders was not external, but internal: the long-term influence of 
the imperial past on the leadership, together with their aspirations to foment world 
revolution. At least until the 1970s, the PRC’s understanding of territorial sovereignty 
was still a work in progress; the country’s leaders did not see China as a modern nation-
state. Consequently, the PRC failed also to treat its neighbours as modern nation-states 
and to establish with them normalised, state-to-state relations. 
 
 
References  
 
Aletai diquzhi (Altay Prefecture Gazetteer). Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow. 
 
Bi Aonan. “Lishi yujing zhong de wangchao Zhongguo jiangyu gainian bianxi – yi 
tianxia, sihai, Zhongguo jiangyu, bantu wei li” (An analysis of imperial China’s concept of 
the frontier in historical context: ‘All Under Heaven’; ‘The Four Oceans’; ‘The Middle 
Kingdom’; ‘Frontier Zones’; ‘Territory’ as keywords). Zhongguo bianjiang shide yanjiu 16.1 
(2006): 1-13. 
 
Chang Xiaohe. “‘Zhuyi’ yu ‘anquan’ zhi zheng: liushiniandai Chaoxian yu Zhong-Su 
guanxi de yanbian” (The struggle between ‘isms’ and ‘security’: the evolution of Korean 
and Sino-Soviet relations through the 1960s). Waijiao pinglun 2 (2009): 21-35. 
 
 27 
Chen Jian. “Geming yu weiji de niandai: dayuejin he Zhongguo duiwai zhengce de 
gemingxing zhuanbian” (In an age of revolution and crisis: the Great Leap Forward and 
the revolutionary turn in China’s foreign policy). Lengzhan guoji shi yanjiu 7 (Winter 2008): 
45-96. 
 
Chen Saixi. “Lun zhongguo jiejue bianjie zhengduan de moshi” (On China’s model for 
resolving border disputes). Guangdong waiyu waimao daxue xuebao 20.3 (May 2009): 46-50. 
 
Dai Chaowu. “Zhong-Yin bianjie chongtu yu sulian de fanying he zhengce” (Sino-Indian 
border clashes and the Soviet policy response). Lishi yanjiu 3 (2003): 58-79.  
 
______. Zhongguo yu Yindu de guanxi (1950-1965): jiyu duoguo jiemi dangan de yanjiu (Sino-
Indian Relations (1950-1965): Research Drawn from International Declassified 
Archives). Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, forthcoming. 
 
Das, Gautam. China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future. New Delhi: 
Har-Anand Publications PVT LTD, 2009. 
 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping) Volume 3. 
Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993. 
 
Deng Xiaoping nianpu (1975-1997) (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1997)). Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Fan Hongwei. “Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de jiejue: guocheng yu yingxiang” (The 
resolution of the Sino-Burmese border question and its implications). Nanyang wenti yanjiu 
3 (2010): 36-45. 
 
Feng Jianyong. “Goumian minzu guojia: xinhai geming qianhou de Zhongguo bianjiang” 
(Constructing a nation-state: China’s frontiers before and after the 1911 Revolution). 
Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 21.3 (2011): 63-72. 
 
Feng Yue and Qi Pengfei. “Zhong-Mian bianjie tanpan shulüe” (Summary of Sino-
Burmese border negotiations). Hunan keji daxue xuebao 9.6 (2006): 53-62. 
 28 
 
Galenovich, Iu. M. Rossiia and Kitai v XX veke: Granitsa (Russia and China in the 20th 
century: the border). Moskva: Izograf, 2001. 
 
Garver, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001. 
 
Gao Fei. “Jianping Zhongguo chuli lingtu zhengduan de yuanze ji linian” (A brief 
assessment of the principles and beliefs behind China’s management of territorial 
disputes). Waijiao pinglun 105 (October 2008): 25-31. 
 
Goncharov, Sergey N. and Li Danhui. “E-Zhong guanxi zhong de ‘lingtu yaoqiu’ he 
‘bupingdeng tiaoyue’” (Territorial demands’ and ‘unequal treaties’ in Sino-Soviet 
relations). Ershiyi shiji (October 2004): 110-117.  
 
Guangxi Autonomous Region Archive, China. 
 
Guangxi Zhuang Nationality Autonomous Region Archive. 
 
Han Xiaoqing. “Zhongguo yu Bajisitan jiejue shuangbian ludi bianjie wenti waijiao 
tanpan de lishi kaocha” (A historical investigation into the diplomatic negotiations 
leading up to the resolution of the Sino-Pakistan border issue). Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 
6 (2011): 90-98. 
 
Hoffman, Steven A. India and the China Crisis. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1990. 
 
Huang Xiangping and Qi Pengfei. “Qianxi Zhongguo zhengfu zai Zhong-Yin bianjie 
zhengduang zhong de weiji chuli” (Preliminary Analysis of the Chinese government’s 
crisis management in the Sino-Indian border dispute). Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 1 (2006): 
79-86.  
 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives, China. 
 
 29 
Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selection of important documents since 1949) 
Volume 1. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1992. 
 
Jiangsu Provincial Archives, China. 
 
Jilin Provincial Archives, China. 
 
Jin Chongji ed. Zhou Enlai zhuan (Biography of Zhou Enlai) Volume 2. Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998. 
 
Karunakar, Gupta. The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier. Calcutta: Minerva 
Associates, 1974. 
 
Lenin, Vladimir. The State and Revolution. At 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch01.htm (accessed 23 
January 2014). 
 
Li Dalong. “Shilun Zhongguo jiangyu xingcheng he fazhan de fenqi he tedian” (Phases 
and features of the development of China’s frontiers). Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 21.3 
(2011): 22-32. 
 
Li Danhui. “Tongzhi jia xiongdi: 1959 niandai Zhong-Su bianjie guanxi – dui Zhong-Su 
bianjie wenti de lishi kaocha (zhi yi)” (Comrades plus brothers: Sino-Soviet border 
relations in the 1950s – a historical investigation into the Sino-SovietfFrontier issue (part 
1)). Guoji lengzhanshi yanjiu 1 (autumn 2004): 71-102. 
 
______. “Zhengzhi doushi yu dishou: 1960 niandai Zhong-Su bianjie guanxi – dui 
Zhong-Su bianjie wenti de lishi kaocha (zhi er)” (Political warriors and antagonists: Sino-
Soviet border relations in the 1960s – a historical investigation into the Sino-Soviet 
frontier issue (part 2)). Shehui kexue 2 (2007): 146-167.  
 
Liao Xinwen. “Ershi shiji wushi niandai Zhongguo chuli ludi bianjie wenti de yuanze ye 
banfa” (The principles by and ways in which post-1949 China managed issues relating to 
 30 
its land borders). Paper given at the conference “China in the 1950s” (Shanghai, August 
2004).  
 
Lin Yunhui. Wutuobang yundong: cong dayuejin dao dajihuang (1958-61) (A utopian movement: 
from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Famine (1958-61)). Hong Kong: Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 2008. 
 
Lingtu bianjie shiwu guoji tiaoyue he falü huibian (Compilation of international treaties and 
laws regarding territorial and border affairs). Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe, 2006. 
 
Liu Jinjie. “Zhong-Mian bianji zhong de ‘Maikemahongxian’ wenti ji qi jiejue” (The 
problem of the McMahon Line within the Sino-Burmese border, and its resolution”. 
Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu 1 (2006): 87-98. 
 
Liu Xiaoyuan. “Zhongguo de minzu, bianjiang wenti ji qi lingtu shuxing de jindai 
zhuanxing” (China’s national and border issues, and the modern transformation of its 
territoriality). In Li Xiaobing and Tian Xiansheng eds., Xifang shixue qianyan yanjiu pingxi 
(Research into the frontiers of Western historiography). Shanghai: Shanghai cishu 
chubanshe, 2008, 1-23. 
 
______. “Bianjiang Zhongguo he 1949 nian” (1949 on China’s frontiers), Zhongguo 
dangdai shi yanjiu 3 (2011): 117-136. 
 
______. “Chongsu Zhongguo xingzhuang: er zhan qijian Meiguo zhanlue siwei yu 
Zhongguo shaoshu minzu bianjiang” (Reconstructing China’s outlines: American 
strategy between the World Wars and China’s frontier national minorities). Lishi jiaoxue 
wenti 5 (2010): 15-20. 
 
Ma Dazheng. “Ershi shiji Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu” (20th-century research into 
the historical geography of China’s frontiers), Lishi yanjiu 4 (1996): 137-151. 
 
Ma Rongjiu, “Tongxiang chongtu zhilu: lun Yindi bianjie zhengce yu Zhong-Yin lingtu 
zhengduan” (The road to conflict: on Indian border policy and the Sino-Indian territory 
dispute). Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Beijing University, 2008). 
 31 
 
Mahmud Ali, S. Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 
1950s. Richmond: Curzon, 1999. 
 
Mao Zedong. Poems. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976. 
 
______. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selections of Mao Zedong’s diplomatic writings). 
Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994. 
 
Maxwell, Neville. India’s China War. Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1972. 
 
Miasnikov, V. S. and E. D. Stepanov. Granitsy Kitaia, Istoriia formitorvaniia (The borders of 
China: a history of formation). Moskva: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2001. 
 
Mu Ani. “Chuyi Zhong-Ni bianjie tanpan zhong de jiaodian: Zhufeng wenti de chuli” 
(Preliminary observations on the focus of Sino-Nepalese negotiations: the Everest 
problem), Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue 1 (2013): 55-63. 
 
Nei Menggu zizhiquzhi: waishizhi (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Gazetteer: foreign 
affairs section). Hohhot: Yuanfang chubanshe, 2009. 
 
Nie Hongyi. “Ding ding guojiang: xin Zhongguo chengli 60 nian Zhongguo bianjie wenti 
yanjiu” (Fixing the frontiers: research into China’s frontiers since the founding of the 
PRC). Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2011. 
 
______ and Li Bin. “Zhongguo zai lingtu zhengduan zhong de zhengce xuanze” 
(China’s territorial disputes and policy choices). Guoji zhengzhixue 4 (2008): 1-34. 
 
Niu Jun. “1962: Zhongguo duiwai zhengce ‘zuo’ zhuan de qianye” (1962: the eve of 
China’s ‘left turn’ in foreign policy). Lishi yanjiu 3 (2003): 23-40. 
 
Nobuo, Shimotomai. “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-
1972.” In Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991 (Washington and 
Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2011), 122-151. 
 32 
 
Qi Pengfei. “Zhong-Ni bianjie tanpan de lishi jincheng he jiben jingyan” (The history 
and lessons of China’s border negotiations with Nepal). Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu 2 
(2011): 90-98. 
 
______. Daguo jiangyu: dangdai Zhongguo ludi bianjie wenti shulun (The territory of a major 
power: on contemporary China’s land border issues). Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi 
chubanshe, 2013.  
 
Qiu Meirong. “Weiji waiguozhong de guonei yinsu: yi Zhong-Yin weiji (1959-1962) wei li” 
(Domestic factors in crisis diplomacy: the case-study of the 1959-62 Sino-Indian crisis). 
Guoji guancha 4 (2007), 27-33.  
 
Schaefer, Bernd. “North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow, 1966-1972,” 
CWIHP Working Paper 44 (October 2004). 
 
Shen Zhihua. “Mao Zedong yu dongfang qingbaoju – Yazhou geming zhudaoquan de 
zhuanyi” (Mao Zedong and the Eastern Intelligence Bureau: the transfer of leadership in 
the Asian revolution). Huadong shifan daxue xuebao 6 (2011): 27-37.  
 
______. Wunai de xuanze: lengzhan yu Zhong-Su tongmeng de mingyun, 1945-49 (No choice: the 
Cold War and the fate of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (1945-59)). Beijing: Shehui kexue 
wenxianchu, 2013. 
 
______ ed. Zhong-Su guanxi shigang: 1917-1991 nian Zhong-Su guanxi ruogan wenti zai tantao 
(An outline of Sino-Soviet relations: an investigation into various problems in Sino-
Soviet relations 1917-1991). Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011. 
 
______ and Dong Jie. “Zhong-Chao bianji zhengyi de jiejue” (The resolution of the 
Sino-North Korean border dispute). Ershiyi shiji 4 (2011): 34-51  
 
Suh, Dae-sook. Kim Il Song: The North Korean Leader. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1988. 
 
 33 
Taylor Fravel, M. Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial 
Disputes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
Tkachenko, B. I. Rossiia – Kitai: vostochnaia granitsa v dokumentakh i faktakh (Russia – China: 
The eastern border in documents and facts). Vladivostok: Ussuri, 1999. 
 
Wang Shilu. “Zhong-Mian bianji tiaoyue moshi dui jiejue Zhong-Yin bianjie wenti de 
yingxiang” (The form of the Sino-Burmese border treaty and its influence on the Sino-
Indian border issue). Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu baogao 3-4 (1993): 37-48. 
 
Wang Taiping ed. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi (1957-69) (Diplomatic History of the 
PRC, 1957-69) Volume 2. Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe, 1998. 
 
Wang Zhichun. Qingchao rouyuanji (A chronicle of the Qing dynasty’s policy of cherishing 
distant lands). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989. 
 
Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press, 1975. 
 
Wu Lengxi. Shinian lun zhan (1956-1966) (Ten years of talking about war (1956-1966)). 
Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999. 
 
Xinjiang Weiwuer Autonomous Region Gazetteer Editorial Committee. Xinjiang tongzhi: 
waishizhi (Xinjiang Gazetteer: foreign affairs section). Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin 
chubanshe, 1995. 
 
Xinjiang Yili Hasake Autonomous Prefectural Archives, China. 
 
Xu Yan. “Jiefanghou woguo chuli bianjie chongtu weiji de  huigu he zongjie (A summary 
of China’s management of border conflicts and crises since 1949). Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi 3 
(2005): 16-21. 
 
 34 
Yang Gongsu. “Zhong-Yin bianjie wenti de lishi zhenxiang” (The historical reality 
behind the Sino-Indian border issue). Zhongguo bianjiang shi di yanjiu baogao 4 (May 1989): 
1-13. 
 
Yao Zhongming et al. “Zhou Enlai zongli jiejue Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti de huihuang 
yeji (Zhou Enlai’s glorious record in resolving the China-Burma border question). In Pei 
Xianzhang ed., Yanjiu Zhou Enlai – waijiao sixiang yu shijian (Research on Zhou Enlai: 
foreign policy philosophy and practice). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989. 
 
Yili Prefectural Archives, China. 
 
Zhang Qingmin. “Zhongguo jiejue ludi bianjie jingyan dui jiejue haiyang bianjie de qishi” 
(What China can learn from its land border disputes in resolving maritime border issues). 
Waijiao pinglun 4 (2013): 1-16. 
 
Zhang Xiangshan, “Zhong-Ri fujiao tanpan huigu” (A review of the resumption of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic relations), Riben xuekan 1 (1998): 32-49. 
 
Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
 
Zheng Wen. “Lun gudai Zhongguo de guojiaguan yu tianxia guan: bianjing yu bianjie 
xingcheng de lishi zuobiao” (Ancient China’s concept of state and empire: the historical 
coordinates of China’s borders). Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 17.3 (2007): 16-23. 
 
Zhong Hongnian. “Qingdai fanshu guanning de bianhua yu Zhongguo jiangtu de 
bianqian” (The concept of vassaldom during the Qing dynasty and the transformation of 
China’s frontiers). Qingshi yanjiu 4 (2006): 17-27. 
 
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo bianjie shiwu tiaoyueji (Collected border treaties of the PRC). 
Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-76 (A chronology of Zhou Enlai 1949-76) Volume 2. Beijing: 
Zhongyan wenxian chubanshe, 1997. 
 
 35 
Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Zhou Enlai’s selected diplomatic works). Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 1990. 
 
Zhou Shougao and Qi Pengfei. “Guanyu 1963 nian Zhong-A bianjie tiaoyue tanpan 
jincheng zhong de ‘leng’ yu ‘re’ xianxiang yu tanxi – yi Zhongguo waijiaobu xinjin jiemi 
dangan wei zhu” (The ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ phases in the 1963 Sino-Afghanistan border treaty 
negotiations: an enquiry based on newly declassified documents in China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs). Nanya yanjiu 4 (2011): 16-27 
 
Zhu Zhaohua. Zhong-Mian bianjie wenti yanjiu: yi jindai Zhong-Ying bianjie tanpan wei zhongxin 
(Research into the Sino-Burmese border question, focusing on Sino-British border 
negotiations from the late Qing period). Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007.  
 
______. “Xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de dianfan – jiyu Zhong-Mian bianjie 
de huading” (New China’s model for handling border disputes, and its origins in the 
designation of the Sino-Burmese border). Tansuo yu zhengming 4 (2009): 73-76.  
 
______. “20 shiji wu liushi niandai xin Zhongguo chuli bianjie zhengduan de yuanze yu 
shijian” (Resolution of China’s border disputes in the 1950s and 1960s: theory and 
practice). Suzhou keji xueyuan xuebao 29.5 (September 2012): 1-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
